"multiculturalism" and "the cultural Marxism" of the social democratic government of Jens Stoltenberg. 5 Counter to the request of the public prosecutor's office, Breivik was ultimately declared not criminally insane on 24 August 2012, and sentenced to 21 years in prison and subsequent preventive detention for the murder of 77 people. The verdict was unanimous. Breivik filed no appeal, but rejected the authority of the court. All of this -the course of events of the crime, the contents of Breivik's pamphlet, the progress of the trial -was reported to the public in Western media over weeks and months. Breivik's terrifying act was unanimously condemned, and Breivik himself judged to be either a terrorist and a confused political extremist or a pathological violent criminal and insane "amok-runner". 6 
Proto-definitions
However, let us begin not with the amok-runner but with the terrorist, or rather with the concept of the terrorist, from which -as will be shown -the concept of the amok-runner can also be derived. 7 Especially since 9/11, "terrorist" is not only a loaded term in politics and the media but also one that is used at will by anyone against virtually anyone, as soon as he or she becomes violently politically active. Particularly in the context of hegemonic discourses as they have been conducted time and again since 9/11, seizing discursive authority seems sufficient in order to deem someone a terrorist. Reasons appear to be irrelevant, definitions obsolete: a terrorist is a terrorist merely because he or she has been referred to as such.
If, however, one wants to move beyond the level of tautological statements that would define a terrorist solely on the basis that he or she is a terrorist, thus in the form T(x) ↔ T(x), 8 then the terrorist must be defined by a characteristic that is precisely not that of being a terrorist. An approach here is offered by the term itself: with respect to its etymological origins, the term "terrorist" is derived from the Latin "terrere" (to terrify). 9 We take this as an opportunity to define "terrorist" as "terrifier", albeit in a (grammatically) transitive sense as the terrifier of someone. Thus it becomes possible to make the term relational and to define it as a binary predicate, formally as T(x) ↔ E(y,x): "x is a terrorist if and only if y feels terrified by x". We expressly do not distinguish here between feeling and being: both "feeling terrified" and "being terrified" are understood as synonymous. 10 In the relational determination "y feels terrified by x" or "y is terrified by x", E(y,x), x expresses the quantity of terrifiers and y the quantity of those terrified, the latter referring to either the world or a regional population. Analogously, a freedom fighter can be identified as the liberator of someone and accordingly defined as F(x) ↔ B(y,x): x is thus only a freedom fighter if y is or feels liberated by x. In the relational determination "y is liberated by x", B(y,x), x now expresses the quantity of liberators and y the quantity of those liberated, the latter again referring either to the world or to a regional population.
However, the above still does not provide an adequate definition of "terrorist" and "freedom fighter". "To terrify" and "to liberate" are both, in the context of a discourse on terrorists or freedom fighters, tied to acts of violence -more accurately, to acts of politically motivated violence. Therefore, the use of force should also be formally considered so that both predicates are distinguished as ternary predicates. 11 As such, "y is terrified of x by means of z" applies for the terrifier relation, and, accordingly, "y is liberated by x by means of z" applies for the freedom-fighter relation. This in turn results in the following statement forms: for the terrorist, T(x,z) ↔ E(y,x,z) -i.e., "x is a terrorist and z is an attack if and only if y feels terrified by x by means of z" -and for the freedom fighter, F(x,z) ↔ B(y,x,z) -i.e., "x is a freedom fighter and z is a liberating blow if and only if y feels liberated by x by means of z."
If we apply these definitions to specific cases, we obtain statements whose truth is verifiable. For example: the attempted bombing assassination of Adolf Hitler by Claus Schenk, Graf von Stauffenberg on 20 July 1944 sets the variables x and z such that Stauffenberg is the committer of the violence and the bombing is the act of violence. With that alone, however, it has not yet been determined whether Stauffenberg is a terrorist or a freedom fighter. Stauffenberg becomes a terrorist or freedom fighter only when y is also determined. If y feels terrified, then Stauffenberg is a terrorist; if y feels liberated by his act, then Stauffenberg is a freedom fighter. But who or what is this y? Obviously, it is no single individual, or else Stauffenberg would be alternatively a terrorist or a freedom fighter depending on whom one asks. Thus, it seems only sensible not to ask specific individuals or specific groups of individuals but rather all individuals, or at least all individuals affected. 12 To be sure, it seems at first contradictory to intuitive legal or moral sensibilities to claim that the committers of violence and the acts of violence are not in themselves terroristic, but that they only become so if one understands them in the context of a terrifier relation or liberator relation. However, the whole premise becomes plausible once one places the circumstance against the specific background of resistance during World War II: today, Stauffenberg's attempt to assassinate Hitler in July 1944 is naturally not deemed an act of terrorism, but is seen as rather a liberating blow. Whether it also qualified as a liberating blow in Germany in 1944, however, is in question, as the reference group of evaluators today is a completely different one from in 1944. The deciding factor, therefore, is the evaluation of the act and the committer of the act, not the act itself: even if Stauffenberg's bomb had been better placed or contained a greater explosive force and had killed Hitler as planned, the violent act would still be regarded today as a liberating blow and Stauffenberg as a liberator or freedom fighter.
Based on the group of people affected by the violence, one can now generally determine who is a freedom fighter by means of quantification: a freedom fighter is one whose act of political violence causes the majority to feel liberated. Conversely, a terrorist is defined by the fact that the majority is terrified by his or her violence: to be a terrorist or a freedom fighter, then, means no more and no less than to be deemed by the majority to be a "terrifier" or a "liberator". The "legal concept" thus becomes a relative one and the decision-making process a democratic one. We move from a definition established by the authority of individuals to one decided on by the (democratic) majority.
By then quantifying those terrified and liberated from the group of evaluators with regard to majorities, the following formal definitions of politically motivated violence and those who commit it emerge: 1 F(x,z) ↔ W(y) B(y,x,z) 13/14 Someone carries out a liberating blow as a freedom fighter = df The majority feels liberated by the committer/act of violence.
Someone commits an attack as a terrorist = df The majority feels terrified by the committer/act of violence.
Against the background that the majority includes "all" as a special case, 15 one can additionally derive the definition of a hero and an amokrunner: while the number of those liberated is nearly everybody in the case of a hero, the number of those terrified is nearly everybody in the case of someone running amok. Almost all the evaluators feel terrified by the rampage or liberated by the heroic deed: 16 3 H(x,z) ↔ ∀(y) B(y,x,z) 17 Someone commits a heroic act as a hero = df Almost everyone feels liberated by the committer/act of violence. 4 A(x,z) ↔ ∀(y) E(y,x,z) 18 Someone goes on a rampage as an amok-runner = df Almost everyone feels terrified by the committer/act of violence.
A historical example of a freedom fighter is given in a textbook from the German Democratic Republic. In reference to events in Havana on 8 January 1959, this states: "The people received their liberators with indescribable enthusiasm." 19 Indeed, Fidel Castro and the approximately 1,500 rebels with whom he reached the Cuban capital can be regarded on this day and in regard to the Cuban people as freedom fighters and their acts of violence as acts of liberation. That Castro and his revolution would, no doubt, be judged differently by a different reference group or at another time does not change this fact.
If things were as described in a Spiegel headline of 29 May 2009, which refers to Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as "The man the world fears", then one would actually have in Ahmadinejad a candidate for the definition of a globally perceived amok-runner. However, the headline ultimately says more about how the press and mass media in general function than about the status of Ahmadinejad. As such, journalistic media do not just simply present events as accurately as possible. Rather, the media also construct media events by means of the rhetoric of images and text. In this case, we are dealing with a non-actual mode of expression based on the trope of a generalising synecdoche and a hyperbole. It is precisely not "the world" -i.e., the sum total of all human beings -that is terrified or afraid, but rather, if anything, the majority of people: the text rhetorically generalises and exaggerates. In fact, it seems here to be a matter of merely a terrorist, whose current and future acts of violence are feared by the world.
Only if Ahmadinejad had actually also used the atomic bomb, as is implied, among other things, by the Spiegel, would this satisfy our definition of a rampage and our definition of an amok-runner who terrifies (almost) everyone, hence "the world", with his violent actions. What is merely ascribed to Ahmadinejad, Anders Breivik can lay genuine claim to for himself. Breivik's attack can be regarded as a rampage and Breivik himself as an amok-runner for the very reason that his murder of 77 mostly young adults terrified the entire world, or at least the entire Western world.
Despite the examples given above for amok-runners, terrorists and freedom fighters (the hero has yet to be discussed), we are not dealing thus far with complete definitions, but rather only with proto-definitions, insofar as the relationship between "to terrify" and "to liberate" has yet to be determined. Only in the following will this relationship be formulated in the context of three modellings: contradictory modelling, contrary modelling and contingency modelling.
Contradictory Modelling
In addition to the possibility of feeling liberated or terrified, the situation can arise of someone reporting neither feeling, or reporting both feelings at the same time. However, in these cases -and exactly that is the basis of the first modelling -the evaluator will be regarded as undecided. The following considerations are therefore based exclusively on either/or choices. Leaving the group of undecideds out of consideration can be justified by drawing an analogy to a voting decision. In an election I can also not decide to vote -i.e., I can abstain -or alternatively spoil my ballot paper by voting for all the candidates at the same time and, in so doing, likewise not decide. Thus, the others ultimately decide for me, and the result of the election is determined exclusively by the deciders.
With the exclusion of the group of undecided or non-deciders, the relationship of feeling terrified and feeling liberated is contradictory, so that in the following, the attributes "feeling liberated" and "not feeling terrified" and, by association, "feeling terrified" and "not feeling liberated" are treated as semantically synonymous and formal-logically equivalent. Formally, ∀(y) [B(y,x,z) ↔ ¬E(y,x,z)] as well as ∀(y) [E(y,x,z) ↔ ¬B(y,x,z)] apply. 20 On the basis of contradiction, then, terrifiers can be defined qua negation as liberators and liberators qua negation as terrifiers. For the terrorist, then, in addition to the above definition (2), the following also applies:
Someone commits an attack as a terrorist = df The majority do not feel liberated by the violent act/perpetrator. Also, the fact that Western media refer to Anders Breivik variously as a terrorist and as an amok-runner does not run contrary to our determination of Breivik, insofar as an amok-runner is always, per definitionem, a terrorist: the terrifying of everybody always implies the terrifying of the majority. However, what is gained with the definition of the amokrunner is the following: counter to the usual discourses, amok-runners can now be described completely independently of motives, triggers and predispositions. In order to identify such cases, namely those of political amok-runners, it is no longer necessary to diagnose insanity or a prehistory and disposition that have caused their acts of madness.
22 All (remote) diagnoses by professionals and populist media can certainly have, ideally, an aetiological function for the purpose of preventing future killing sprees; nevertheless, aetiology is irrelevant for the identification of the amok-runner as such. The violence of the amok-runner is "crazy" because and only because of the fact that it terrifies (almost) everyone.
Usually, however, it is assumed, at least implicitly if not explicitly, that being an amok-runner and being a terrorist are mutually exclusive, and thus that the relationship is at least a contrary one: a political motivation is not ascribed to amok-runners, since they are insane, whereas a political motivation and thus, implicitly, not insanity is ascribed to terrorists. Precisely this was the explicit issue at Breivik's trial. Different assessments were given of Breivik's mental condition, which varyingly attested to his responsibility or diminished capacity, ergo insanity. The latter finding would have had the consequence that he could not have been charged -especially in the legal sense -with an act of terrorism and thus with a politically motivated act of violence.
This ultimately explains why Breivik himself insisted on being classified as legally sane: he needed to be considered sane in order to be regarded as the political assassin that he also held himself to be. However, according to the quantitative determination of a terrorist as amok-runner, precisely this differentiation is irrelevant. Breivik can as such be seen as both terrorist and amok-runner: that is to say, as an amok-runner and simultaneously also as a terrorist, who is mad because he terrifies nearly everybody with his politically motivated act. Conversely, the public prosecutor's office had to plead to the very end for Breivik's legal insanity (in the context of the conventional definition), in order to deny his violent acts any political status. The impulse was to regard this mad action not as a political one and, therefore, it had to be considered insane, or regarded as something else -i.e., something neither insane nor political -which apparently was also not a desirable option. One could not, however, view Breivik's action as political and insane at the same time. 23 This becomes possible only with the new definition of the amokrunner as an almost limitless terrifier. Breivik is now insane simply by virtue of the fact that his act terrified almost everyone, and not only, say, because he regards his actions, contradictorily, as terrifying and liberating at the same time. This contradiction is in any case only the result of a contradictory or contrary modelling of "to terrify" and "to liberate": a contradictory or contrary relation between "to terrify" and "to liberate" is precisely the precondition for such a contradiction. Therefore, it will be shown that with contingency modelling this very condition is rendered invalid.
If one again considers the political amok-runner defined here in comparison with a political hero, yet another phenomenon arises: in actual fact, and in contrast to amok-runners, terrorists and freedom fighters, no real examples can be found for politically motivated heroes. Politically motivated heroes and heroic deeds seem to exist only in the form of fictionalising narratives. This phenomenon can be described, however, only on the basis of a contrary modelling.
Contrary Modelling
The contrariety between "to terrify" and "to liberate" means that one can now also choose to feel neither terrified nor liberated. At the same time, one still cannot feel simultaneously liberated and terrified. Formally, the following applies: ∀(y) [B(y,x,z) → ¬E(y,x,z)] and ∀(y) [E(y,x,z) → ¬B(y,x,z)]. 24 With this, we have for the first time a concept of the freedom fighter as one who must be not only a non-terrifier but also a liberator: while the characteristic of being terrifying continues to be sufficient to define a terrorist, the quality of being non-terrifying is not sufficient to define a freedom fighter. For while "to terrify" continues to imply "to not liberate", "to not terrify" now (unlike under contradictory modelling) no longer implies "to liberate". Conversely, although "to liberate" still implies "to not terrify", "to not liberate" no longer implies "to terrify". The synonymy that exists within the framework of contradictory modelling is thus nullified, so that we achieve a more nuanced concept of the liberator in relation to the terrifier and vice versa.
If one describes the contrariety between "to terrify" and "to liberate" again by means of the voting analogy, this would entail that those who decide in a contradictory manner for all-of-the-above candidates, in this case "liberator" and "terrifier", continue to be discounted (as void). However, those who remain undecided, who feel thus neither terrified nor unterrified, are counted now as non-voters. This has the consequence that a majority of undecideds can also form, and converselyas was the case under contradictory modelling -a majority of terrified or liberated need not materialise; thus it follows from the contradictory modelling that every act of violence must necessarily be classified as an act of terrorism/rampage or a liberating blow/heroic deed, while in the context of a contrary relationship the status of the committer of violence can remain open. As such, contrary modelling of "to liberate" and "to terrify" ultimately makes possible a sort of scepticism, 25 not in the sense of being undecided between "terrified" and "not terrified" or "liberated" and "not liberated", but as a decision against a compelled definition of oneself either as "liberated" or as "terrified". 26 It may not, in the context of an election, sound very plausible to factor in non-deciders and thus non-voters, precisely because this could entail the idea that even all the parties put together might not attain a majority, since this would actually be held by the undecideds. However, in the discourse around decisions relating to politically motivated violence and those who commit it, majorities comprised of undecideds indeed make sense. When one bears in mind what consequences are entailed by declaring someone to be a terrorist, the argument in favour of contrary modelling and against contradictory modelling is clear: under contradictory modelling, if one cannot or does not want to classify someone as a liberator, then one has to automatically classify him or her as a terrorist. Yet the decision to classify someone as a terrorist or amok-runner has far-reaching implications for action -prosecution, retaliation, violence, war and death -further-reaching implications, in any event, than the decision to classify someone as a freedom fighter or hero.
However, if one again considers the difference between heroes and amok-runners on the basis of the concept of the freedom fighter as differentiated from the concept of the terrifier, the following becomes apparent: a heroic act that liberates almost everyone differs from a rampage that terrifies almost everyone in that the latter represents an "instantaneously possible event": i.e., one that can occur virtually immediately. This is due to the fact that amok-runners do not change the world, but rather simply terrify almost everyone. However, in the case of the hero, the situation is different. Because the number of those liberated by the heroic act is nearly everybody, we are dealing here with a "revolutionary event" in a broader sense and a "meta-event" in a stricter sense in the spirit of Jurij Lotman's structural text analysis. 27 This means that in the course of the meta-event initiated by the hero, the world represented in a text is restructured: "boundaries are shifted, are reconstituted, and new, different orders are established." 28 It is precisely this, however, that banishes the concept of the hero to the fictional realm. However often it may appear in fictional texts, the meta-event of a heroic deed is, in the reality of its time, improbable: as a rule, acts of violence do not change the world from one moment to the next and by unanimous consensus. A consensus must first be narratively produced and made possible historically: "heroic history" is written only in retrospect, and heroes almost never exist in actuality, but rather primarily in the fictional texts of propaganda and political utopia, for the very reason that their stories claim correspondence to a nearly impossible event. If, on the other hand, heroic deeds are to exist in reality, these must be preceded by a very special structure of the world and society, a structure that allows (almost) everybody to experience the violent act of the hero immediately as a liberation. This, in turn, can only happen, if (almost) everybody has regarded themselves previously as unfree.
Thus, when Breivik justifies his killing spree by claiming, among other things, to be the "liberator of mankind", he may be a hero in his own eyes. However, this has little to do with reality, precisely because not (nearly) everyone regarded themselves as unfree, at least not in Norway, the Western world and probably also not in the rest of the world. Thus, Breivik is apparently living completely in his own world and for this very reason was deemed -completely correctly -insane. 29 Breivik can, though, also be deemed insane because he sees himself not only as a liberator but also as a terrifier, for example when he realistically observes: "I know that it was cruel, that I have inflicted indescribable grief." 30 Here he produces an obvious contradiction that, if you will, again verifies his insanity. However, this contradiction is valid only in the context of a contrary and contradictory relation between "to terrify" and "to liberate".
Contingency Modelling
In the framework of a contingency modelling, it is quite possible for "terrifying" and "liberating" to exist simultaneously: in addition to the possibility of feeling liberated or terrified and the state of feeling neither, now the state can arise of someone feeling both at the same time. Despite the contingent relation between "to liberate" and "to terrify", the concepts of liberating and terrifying themselves will not become random or arbitrary, as is sometimes implied by the use of the term "contingency" in cultural studies. On the contrary, it will continue to be impossible for one to be simultaneously liberated and not liberated or terrified and not terrified. Formally, the following applies: ∀(y) ¬[B(y,x,z) ∧¬B(y,x,z)] and ∀(y) ¬[E(y,x,z) ∧¬E(y,x,z)], which, in turn, results from the law of non-contradiction, the basic axiom of bivalent logic, generally expressed as ¬(p ∧¬p): "p and not-p simultaneously are not true."
In the context of our voting analogy, contingency modelling admittedly appears nonsensical. In addition to the undecideds, one would now also consider those who decide in favour of not only one candidate but also simultaneously for one or the other opposition candidates. This, finally, reduces the election to absurdity. Against the background of decisions regarding politically motivated violence and those who commit it, it can nevertheless make sense to consider those who feel terrified and liberated at the same time. When, for example, Nicolae Ceauşescu, the neo-Stalinist dictator of Romania, and his wife, Elena, were sentenced to death by a military court and summarily shot by Ionel Boero and two of his men on 25 December 1989, Romania was at civil war. 31 While units of the Romanian army and the state police were quelling riots and demonstrations by shooting at the people, parts of the army had already sided with the incensed populace. Only with the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu did the regular troops and state police at last switch sides to join the people. The regime changed, and the civil war ended. Thus the execution of Ceauşescu definitively led to the liberation of the Romanian people from Ceauşescu and his oppressive neo-Stalinist regime, as well as to the abrupt end of the civil war. However, this was simultaneously accompanied by horror at the execution itself: a majority of people, and perhaps even the general public, in Romania and in the Western world felt liberated by the politically motivated act of violence, the shooting of the Ceauşescus; however, they were at the same time not also not terrified by the act.
We are dealing, therefore, with a state of affairs that would be excluded under a contrary modelling, but which nonetheless existed. Even 25 years later, Western observers are scarcely able to look upon the Ceauşescu shooting and the "executioners" without dismay -for example when one hears Ionel Boero recount in an interview: "There were three of us and we shot from the hip, from a distance of about seven metres. Each of us had 30 bullets, so 90 bullets in total"; or when Boero speaks of Elena Ceauşescu: "She stank like a beggar-woman and had seemingly soiled her pants out of fear. During the court martial I had to admonish her several times to calm down. I put my hand on her thigh and told her to stop behaving like a gypsy." 32 While it may be quite useful to allow for simultaneous liberation and terror qua modelling, this becomes questionable as soon as one undertakes to quantify those terrified and liberated, so on the level of classifying freedom fighters/heroes or terrorists/amok-runners. Within the proto-definitions of majorities of terrified or liberated, concepts of terrorists, freedom fighters, amok-runners and heroes would emerge which would define a committer of violence simultaneously as a terrorist and freedom fighter, even simultaneously as a hero and madman running amok. However, this is not only a problem peculiar to the underlying proto-definitions. Such a definition of politically motivated committers of violence, which is based on a contingency modelling, ultimately contradicts every (conventional) understanding of freedom fighter and hero -i.e., certainly not as something that is at the same time also a terrorist and amok-runner -and vice versa. Instead, the one group is differentiated from the other, and it is precisely upon this distinction that the proto-definition is genetically constructed.
All this seems to argue emphatically against a contingency modelling of "to terrify" and "to liberate". On the basis of contingency modelling, one could, for example, no longer ascribe to Breivik a contradiction or, as such, insanity, when he declares he is a liberator and terrifier at the same time, and that he is, from his perspective, a hero, while from ours he is a madman. Nevertheless, Breivik, as an all-terrifying amok-runner and a non-liberating "liberator", would remain a madman.
Evaluation
While it is quite apparent that no ideal modelling exists, we can, by again comparing the three modelling experiments, identify one modelling as the most adequate: contradictory modelling, in contrast to the other two, does not make possible an explication of the fictionality of the heroic concept -in the context of politically motivated violence. Other heroes, such as those in sports or, as is common in "real existing socialism", "heroes of labour", are not dealt with here. Not only can these exist; in fact, they did and do exist in great numbers.
In addition, contradictory modelling compels from the outset a decision about committers of politically motivated violence as either terrorists or freedom fighters, while both contrary and contingent relations leave room for indeterminacy and scepticism between "to terrify" and "to liberate"
. And yet what neither a contrary nor a contradictory relation can capture is the potential of a liberating blow to be terrifying. This only becomes possible with a contingency modelling. However -and this is at first glance a clear argument against it -this modelling results in completely counterintuitive and, if you will, counter-conventional concepts of terrorists, freedom fighters, amok-runners and heroes of politically motivated violence. And yet, since a contingency modelling -in contrast to a contradictory modelling -shares the advantages of contrary modelling, it is worthwhile concluding by again considering both of these from a comparative perspective.
In doing so, it becomes evident that a contingency modelling seems useful at the level of individual decisions on being terrified and liberated. On the other hand, a contrary modelling seems necessary at the level of majority decisions and thus for the classification of politically motivated violence and those who commit it as terrorists/amok-runners or freedom fighters/heroes. Nonetheless, the advantages of both modellings can also be realised by a contingency modelling with an additional condition, namely that the majority cannot at the same time be liberated and terrified, or formally W(y) ¬[E(y,x,z) ∧ B(y,x,z)].
On closer inspection, though, the additional condition is nothing more than a relationship that was already implicitly given in contradictory and contrary modellings of "to terrify" and "to liberate". As such, the following applies: ∀(y) [E(y,x,z) → ¬B(y,x,z)] → ¬W(y) [E(y,x,z) ∧ B(y,x,z)].
33 By applying this additional condition to our original example, Breivik, as someone who simultaneously terrifies and liberates, would continue to be not necessarily insane. Breivik would, however, as someone who simultaneously terrifies and liberates the majority, hence as hero and amok-runner, be contradictory and therefore be once again potentially insane. Furthermore, as an amok-runner and a "liberator" who liberates no one, he remains a madman.
While a conditional contingency modelling can, on the basis of a comparison of the modelling approaches, be identified as the most adequate modelling, the modelling experiments demonstrated above and their simultaneous self-reflexive analysis harbour yet another, completely different potential. The real potential of such a formal discourse analysis lies not in the determination and construction of concepts of politically motivated violence and those who commit it, but in the criticism and deconstruction of discourses about politically motivated violence that can be found particularly in the mass media as an articulation, but also as a propagandistic steering, of public opinion. 34 To this end, formal discourse analysis enables us not only to critically scrutinise existing concepts in their arbitrariness and conventionality, as discursive axioms or dispositifs. 35 In the framework of such a method, actual discourses (as systems of concepts) can now be critically assessed in their intrinsic consistency and ultimately in their justification -particularly, but not only, discourses of politically motivated violence. Owing to the performative force that discourses about politically motivated violence can and usually do generate in the public discourse, an analysis and criticism of such terms and the positing of terms is not only highly useful or valuable but also, if the public discourse is to remain self-aware, ultimately unavoidable.
Notes

